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In the Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
REX PACE, BYRON PACE, KEITH
PACE and HARVEY PACE,
Plaintiffs and Respondents,

No. 7677

vs.

JOSEPH A. PARRISH and IDA E.
PARRISH,
Defendants and Appellants.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

INTRODlJCTION
In commenting upon appellants' statement of facts respondents take the position that the statement is incomplete
and misleading, being colored to reflect appellants' arguments
and purposes, and it is particularly misleading and incorrect
in that:
(a) The respondents had not contracted to, nor did
they, sell their own farm for $50,000.00;
(b) Appellants avoid reciting the most believable
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testimony relating to appellant's statements and
repr~sentations concerning ownership of the res ..
ervotr;
(c) The respondents absolutely never examined the
((River Bottom" land in Section 19 as contended
by the appellants; and
(d) The respondents did not request that interroga·
tories be submitted to the jury.
These discrepancies and others will be pointed out and explained in the argument hereinafter set forth.
In ans.wering the contention of the appellants in the case
before the court respondents are not going to attempt to
secure a reversal of any of the findings of the jury or trial
court or of the verdict as it now stands. It is maintained that
the decision is reasonable and just and fully supported by the
law and facts; and, merely because the findings or verdict are
not assailed, respondents do not wish to create the impression
that their case iS: weak. They actually feel that the judgment
doesn't nearly compensate them for their actual loss and that
the jury may have actually shown partiality to the appellants.
Because of the burden placed on the appellate court in
reviewing this and other numerous matters before it respondents will, accordingly, simplify the argument as much as possible.
Since appellants are basing their appeal almost entirely
op the evidence in support of the jury's findings this rebuttal
brief will concentrate on those. matters. Painstaking care and
much research went into the preparation of the complaint and
the instructions given to the jury, at least OJ:?. the part of the
4
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attorney for respondents and by the trial judge. It appears
that neither iten1 has been the subject of attack in appellants'
brief or other\vise. And in denying appellants' motion for a
ne\v trial respondents take the position that Judge Cowley
r~led correctly.

NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an action at law.
t(The action of deceit is of very ancient origin. There
was an old writ of deceit known as early as 1201, which
lay only against a person who had misused legal procedure for the purpose of swindling someone. At a
later period, this writ was superseded by an action on
the case in the nature of deceit, which became the
general common law remedy for fraudulent or even
non-fraudulent misrepresentation which resulted_ in
actual damage ... "
Prosser on Torts (Misrepresentation), p. 704.
In the case of Taylor vs. Moe>re, 87 Utah 493, 51 Pac.
2d 222, plaintiffs brought an action for rescission of a real estate
contract on the ground of fraud. The court pointed out that
Jhis being an equity case" equitable relief. could not be
granted since plain~iff was not promptly before the court
(laches), therefore
the respondents by delay waived
the right to rescind, and they must be left to their remedy
at law for danzages.JJ In that case they quoted from Shappirio
v. Goldberg, 192 U. S. 232 at p. 504:
H

•••

cc

•••

t(In other words, when a party discovers that he has
been deceived in a transaction of this character, he
may resort to an action at law to recover damages, or
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he may have the transaction set aside in which he has
been wronged by rescission of the contract ... " (Italics
added.)
Williston on Contracts, Vol. 5, Sec. 1526, states:
"Setting a fraudulent bargain aside, however, is an
alternative right given on equitable principles to the
injured party, and, therefore, if this remedy is desired,
it must be sought with reasonable promptness after
the fraud has been discovered."
Inasmuch as respondents asked for incidental relief in
having the amount of the judgment deducted from the unpaid
portion of the purchase price appellants have sought to con·
vince this court that the case is one in equity. Throughout
their brief they have indicated that the jury made a new contract for the parties and that the relief sought was the cancellation of notes. But this is not so. Respondents are standing
by their agreement to purchase the ranch. And in view of the
case of Taylor v. Moore (supra) it would appear that they
had no other choice. The sole remedy they seek is an award
of damages due to misrepresentation.
Appellants seek to have this court review the matter as
.a trial da nova on the record on the grounds that the case is
entirely in equity. Respondents maintain that the action and
the r~lief sought make it. strictly a law action; that insofar
as they ask the court to decree that the damages be deducted
from the unpaid purchas~ price that portion of the actionand that only-moves into the realm of equity aq.d is "cognizable in equity" as pointed out in appellants' cited case of
Forrester v. Jastad, to which we shall return promptly. Thus,

6
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since the action is one at law, this court should not disturb
the findings unless there is insufficient evidence to support
them under the well-rec?gnized rule of this court.
Appellants cite the Utah cases of Jensen vs. Howell, 75
Utah 64; 282 Pac. 1034 and Greco vs. Graco, 85 Utah 241; 39
Pac. 2d 318, to support their contentions. However, those
cases involved attempts to secure relief other than damages.
In the former case fraud was alleged but the relief sought
was to have an express trust impressed upon an absolute conveyance of real estate and transfer of personal property; the
latter case was an attempt to cancel and set aside a deed. Admittedly such actions exist in equity, but they do not support
appellants' contentions.
Appellants rely on the case of Forrester vs. Jastad, 167
Pac. 55 (Washington) throughout their brief in support of
their claim that this is an equity case and for other purposes.
Although somewhat identical insofar as involving similar
subject matter that case actually is better authority for respondents since it_ is not in point on appellants' contentions but
is in point for respondents.
Quoting the very sentence preceding that found on page
15 of appellants' brief the Washington court said:
tThe appellants first contend that the action was one
for damages for the breach of a contract, and therefore the allowance of equitable relief by the court
was erroneous. The complaint was based upon the fraud
of appellants; but, instead of seeking rescission on that
ground, they sought to recover damages ... Under Rem
Code No. 15 3 (one fo'rm of action under Code) an
t
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action tnay be maintained for both legal and equitable
'relief.'' (Italics added.)

Quoting Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 2:
. ltThere shall be one form of action to be known as lcivil action.' "
And from Rule 8:
(( . . . Relief in the alternative or of several different
types may be demanded."
Thus, we have the situation .of a legal action for fraud
wherein respondents sought and secured damages, the matter
being ((cognizable in equity" for the purpose of spe~ifying
how damages should be paid by deducting the amount from
the unpaid portion of the purchase price. This element of
equity cannot be said to so reach back to the lawsuit itself so
as to open all of the evidence to a trial da nova on the record.
Had we sought to set aside the contract the result might be
otherwise. In a non-code state respondents would satisfy the
judgment by execution. Because the code permits equitable
relief in a law action in the incidental manner sought in this
case, to hold that appellate review extend to the limits proposed by appellants would defeat much of the purpose of
the codes.
In fact the procedure sought by respondents in their
complaint seems to be distinctly in line with proper procedure under the codes of code states. In preparing the prayer
for relief in the complaint plaintiffs relied on the case of
Paolini v. Sulprizio, 201 Cal. 683; 258 Pac. 380:
l(If the contract remains executory, the damages
which he is entitled to recover are no other and no
8
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greater than those which would be awarded to a party
\vho has fully executed his contract. From any award
which may be made because of the fraud must be deducted any part of the purchase price."
The foregoing rule applies to the case at hand quite clearly.
While in the cited case the unpaid balance of the purchase price
was reduced below the award for damages the rule should be
the same in the case at bar "·here the damages do not measure
up to the unpaid balance of the purchase price by any means.
The proposition advanced by appellants
elementary for further argument.

appears too

PLAINTIFFS SUBMITTED EVIDENCE PROVING
ALL OF THE ELEMENTS OF FRAUD.

(a) In General
ttFraud may be found from a variety of circumstances.
There is no general rule for determining what facts
will constitute it, but it is to be found or not according
to the special circumstances of each particular case.
With regard to modes of perpetration, methods of
defrauding may be broadly classified as being misrepresentation, concealment, or false pretenses."
23 Am. Jur. 762.
The Utah case of Stuck v. Delta Land and Water Co., 6;·
Utah 495; 227 Pac. 791 clearly sets forth all of the essential
elements of fraud to be proved in establishing a cause of
action. In preparing their complaint and in conducting ·the
trial plaintiffs were careful to cover each essential element,
and the jury was so instructed (Instruction No. 2) :

9
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"Fraud consists of a misrepresentation of an existing
fact or facts, which were material in inducing the
plaintiffs to purchase the defendants' farm for the
price agreed upon. The misrepresentations must have
been made by the defendants, either knowing them
to be false or being in ignorance of whether they were
true or false, with the intention that they influence
plaintiffs to so purchase the farm; and the plaintiffs
must have relied on the misrepresentations to their
injury in so purchasing the farm, and must have been
entitled to rely on the misrepresentations under the
circumstances."

(R. A-18)
This lawsuit involves the sale of a 640-acre ranch located
at Mountain Green, Morgan County, Utah. At the time of
sale the ranch consisted of a house, out-buildings, certain
items of livestock and equipment, 63 acres of irrigated land,
30 or 40 acres of dry land and some 540 acres, more or less,
of grazing land, covered with sage brush an~ grass. The area
is set out on Exhibit A-to which plaintiffs will frequently
refer.
Dissecting the ranch from northeast to southwest runs
Cottonwood Creek. To the east of Cottonwood Creek the land
slopes gradually- to the south. On the west of the creek in
the upper two-thirds of the farm the land rises rather sharply
and is_ on a considerably higher elevation.
In this latter area, high above most of the farm, exists an
imposing man-made reservoir of an area of approximately
20 acres which stores early spring water from a ditch leading
into it for use during the summer months (Ex. D, F and 30).
As the undisputed evidence shows the reservoir was used by
10
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some four or more farmers in that area to water their lands
and, in this connection, they had formed the Northwest Irrigation Ditch Company, a non-profit incorporated water association.
It is around the peculiar and novel facts surrounding this
reservoir, and the representations (and concealment) connected
therewith that the nub of this lawsuit is found. Although
other representations \Yere made to the plaintiffs concerning
the farm the basis for their belief in such representations related directly to their belief that they were receiving the entire
reservoir in the purchase of the farm. This fact of the inseparability of the misrepresentations complained of must be kept
in mind at all times throughout this brief.

(b) Defendant made actionable false representations
nzaterial to plaintiffs' purchase of the farm. Since the damages·
awarded plaintiffs in this case, with the exception of $180.00,
arose out of three items of misrepresentation, and inasmuch
as defendants have centered their attack primarily on these
three items, plaintiffs will not attempt to cover the smaller
issues of fences ($100.00 damage award) or hay removed
from the farm ( $80.00 damage award). The evidence on
those items is too clear to create controversy.
The representations made by defendant, all of which
the jury found to have been made and to be untrue, while
dealing with plaintiffs prior to their purchase of the farm
in question, were as follows:

(1) AS TO THE RESERVOIR:
1. ~~I own the reservoir.'' (T. 29)

11
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2. UThe reservoir is on my property." (T. 29, 130)
3. .elf the deal went (goes) through the reservoir
went (goes) with the place." (T. 116)
That the reservoir was not owned by the defendant and
that it did not go with the place were never denied. Defendant admits that he never told the plaintiffs that others had
interests in the reservoir (T. 25, and Brief 21, 22 and 23):

Q. (By Mr. Fuller) Did they know at the time of the
transaction there was water stock or merely onefourth of the reservoir or one-fourth of the water?
A. (By Mr. Parrish) I suppose they knew that stock
belonged to the northwest irrigation ditch company. If they had asked me I would have told
them. (Italics added).
From 23 Am. Jur. 854, I quote:
Generally speaking, however, in the conduct
of various transactions between persons involving business dealings, commercial negotiations, or other relationships relating to property, contracts, and miscellaneous rights, there are times and occasions when the
law imposes upon a party a duty to speak rather than
to remain silent in respect of certain facts within his
know ledge and thus to- disclose information, in order
that the party with whom he is dealing rna y be placed
on an equal footing with him. In such a case a failure
to speak amounts to -a suppression of a fact which
should have been disclosed and is a fraud. As a matter
of fact, in such circumstances a failure to state a fact
is actually equivalent to a fraudulent concealment and
amounts to fraud just as much as an affirmative falsehood."
n

•••

Defendant further admits in his complaint making the
statement, nThe reservoir ts on my property." This latter
12
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remark standing alone, in the absence of suspicious circumstances or other explanatory statements, carries the innuendo
of complete ownership. But let us examine further.
Although stipulated that the abstract was silent thereto
plaintiffs introduced concrete evidence showing that the reservoir was not even on defendants' property although defendant
testified ( T. 8) that it was entire/y so located. This evidence
consisted of a Warranty Deed, signed by each of the two defendants (Ida E. Parrish and Joseph A. Parrish) on November
21, 1932 and recorded on March 16, 1934. It is found in .
Book M, page 373 of the Morgan County records and is completely set out on page 119-A of the transcript. In this deed
the defendants conveyed to the Northwest Irrigation Ditch
Company, grantee:
HAll right, title and interest, amounting to ninetenths ( 9I 10) in that certain Reservoir and Reservoir
Site known as the old "Pond Hole" situated in the
Northwest quarter of Section 19, Township 5 North,
Range 2 East of the Salt Lak~ Meridian."
In their brief defendants contend that plaintiffs must
make out their case, if at all, on the two statements, ('I own
the reservoir. The reservoir is on my place.'' While claiming
that they are quoting ('all'' of the. evidence relating directly
to the reservoir (Brief p. 19) they are carefully and deliberately
avoiding what would normally be considered the most believable type of testimony-that overheard by a totally disinterested third person.
As shown by the evidence Rex Pace, at the time he first
contacted the defendants, was with Mr. Reynold Blackington,

13
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a former well-known resident of Morgan County. The latter
introduced ·Rex Pace to the defendants and returned to the
car while Rex Pace talked with the defendants as to whether
they would sell their farm. When Rex Pace returned to the
car Mr. Blackington overheard the third reference to the reservoir, which defendants, ravoid discussing (T. 116):
BY MR. FULLER:

Q. Did both of them walk out to the car?
A. They both came out together.

Q. Did you ever hear any of the discussion at that
time?
A. Only part of it.

Q. Was any discussion made relative to the reservoir
on the farm?
A. As we were getting ready to go Mr. Parrish said,
CCI£ the deal went (goes) through the reservoir
went (goes) with the- place." (Verb tense
added).
The jury had good opportunity to observe Mr. Blackington's demeanor and the defendants had ample opportunity to
cross-examine him fully. In such a sparsely populated county
the jurists were also undoubtedly aware of Mr. Blackington's
reputation for truth and honesty.
Although defendants contend in their brief that the statements made merely identify the extent of defendants' property we feel that more positive representations could hardly
be made. The jury, too, felt so inclined .

.

Defendants in their brief refer to the statement incorpor-

14
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ated in the Warranty Deed given plaintiffs by defendants wherein the water rights were conveyed as follows:
((Together with the tenements, hereditaments and
appurtenances thereunto belonging or in any wise appertaining, including all water and water rights used
in connection with the land." (See R. A-32).
Since the water was represented by stock certificates in an
incorporated water association, it is contended that had Mr.
Perry, defendants' attorney, known of this fact he would have
used a different method of transferring the water rights. Since
the water was not appurtenant to the farm the purported
method of conveyance passed nothing. to the plaintiffs. And
this situation exists to this very day. Water rights in the
State of Utah are transferred as follows (Utah Code Annotated, 1943, as Amended by Laws of 1945) :
Section 100-1-10:

uwater rights shall be transferred by deed in substantially the same manner as real estate, except when
they are represented by shares of stock in a corporation,
in which case water shall not be deemed to be appurten·
ant to the land; ... " (Italics added.)
The water certificates, properly endorsed and· re-issued,
was the proper medium for transferring defendants' share
of the water to the plaintiffs. The method used merely put
the plaintiffs off-guard and confirmed their beliefs; the proper
method would have quickly clarified the type and amount of
water right being received.
Defendants contend that plaintiffs should be barred from
15
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recovering for the reason that Rex Pace signed the papers
after his two brothers and his father were informed that the
water rights were not as represented. But the evidence shows
that plaintiffs believed themselves unable to extricate themselves from the situation upon the advice of legal counsel,
which they immed~ately sought. Furthermore, defendants
forget that the damage was done on and prior to October 17th,
1947-some 48 days before the papers were signed. In the
meantime the plaintiffs sold their farm (belonging to plaintiff
Harvey Pace) in the Uintah Basin for $25,000.00 (T. 56)obviously receiving less than would have been received had
they had sufficient time to find a ready and willing purchaser
•
under normal circumstances (T. 28). In this connection plaintiffs had uprooted and dispossessed themselves of all of their
former associations and property in contemplation of purchasing defendants' farm.
Three of the four plaintiffs had signed the papers. Under
the circumstances is it any wonder that the parties elected to
continue under the agreement and seek damages when the
full injury resulting from the fraud was determinable, rather
than to immediately seek recission of the contract? (See Taylor
vs. Moore, supra, as to their right of election of remedies.)

(2) AS TO THE ROLLINS' FIELD:
ttBrother, all of the ground you see down there
belongs to me." (T. 32, 92).
While standing at· point ttA'' of Exhibit A on October
17, 1949 (the date of the inspection trip over the farm) Mr.
Parrish held out his hand and made the foregoing statement.

16
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Included within the "ground you see down there" was a tract
of land containing 11% acres of choice ground. It was un·
doubtedly the most clearly visible tract of land in their view.
This can be seen on Exhibit E (designated by an arrow) and
in the reverse direction on Exhibit 7. It shows as Field "E" on
Exhibit A. Although defendant contended at the trial that
the statement was made only as to the cchollow" portion of
what lay below their gaze, Byron Pace testified that the par·
ticular tract was definitely pointed to and that the defendant
made specific reference (T. 92) to it.
This particular piece of ground, although once a part of
the farm (T. 167), actually belonged to Lee Rollins, a neighbor.
It was fenced, the ditch from the reservoir ran around it (and
Since plaintiffs believed they were receiving the reservoir
and since this was irrigated land watered from no other source
the assumption that it was the defendants' was very logical),
it lay in a straight line with defendants' other fields on both
the near and far side of the Rollins' land, the road from defendants' house to the reservoir (which they couldn't travel
that day due to muddy conditions) ran around this particular
field, and it lay in a ccpocket" or valley along with defendants'
land, bordered on one side by hills and on the other side
by the tall cottonwood trees of Cottonwood Creek.
From 23 Am. Jur. 823 (~raud & Deceit) the following
rule is stated:
ttFraud may be predicated upon the fact that one
dealing commercially in land falsely represents that cer·
tain land is included in the tract disposed of*, or mis·
represents the lines or boundaries of the land, thereby
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leading the representee to believe that a certain tract
is covered by the deed where in fact it is not; . . ."
*Referring to Utah as following the rule in the case
of Hecht v. Metzler, 14 Utah 408; 48 Pac. 37.
The Metzler case involved an action for damages on the
grounds of fraud and deceit. The plaintiff had not examined
the property, but relied on the defendants' representations
that the lots produced a definite rental per month, that they
were in a definite location and that they were high and dry.
The court held that
a willful representation by an owner, in the
exchange of ·real estate, that the property exchanged
was high and dry, and located in a particular place,
which representation was relied upon by the purchaser
as true without an inspection of the premises, but
which was false, and which operated to the purchaser's
injury, is an actionable fraud."
t t

From

•

2~·

•

•

Am. Jur. 819:

ttlt is a well-settled principle that false statements
or misrepresentations as to the location of real property which is the subject matter of a transaction constitute actionable fraud and will sustain an action of
deceit or constitute ground for rescinding the contract,
provided they are of such a character and are made
in such a way that the representee has a right to rely
on them."
Because the roadway leading around the Rollins' field
was muddy when the inspection was made (T. 41) the parties
didn't closely examine the field other than from the references
made at point ttA" of Exhibit A. 61 A. L. R. 527 states the
rule further:
18
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{e) Property at a distance or inaccessible. Where
the subject of a sale is at a distance or is otherwise inaccessible at the time of the sale, the purchaser has
the right to rely upon the seller's representations with
respect thereto, and may assert as against the seller
the latter's fraud or misrepresentation concerning the
thing sold, although it would have been possible for
him to have investigated the matter for himself."
(t

The jury wisely found that the defendant made the statements concerning the Rollins' field and that the facts and circumstances satisfied a case of actionable fraud.

(3) AS TO THE ttRIVER BOTTOM" GROUND:
1. celt is pretty good land ... ; here in the lower end

of 19, right here, yes, or this one here is just as
good; some of it is better'' (than the land in the
South Field). (T. 17)
2. ICThe ground in '19' . . . was the same texture as

that we had just seen . . . " (in the South Field) .

(T. 45)
The first foregoing statement, together with more additional interrelated remarks, was volunteered by the defendant
on direct examination as having been told to plaintiffs. The
second statement was Rex Pace's testimony as to what the
defendant said regarding the land marked tcSec. 19-Pasture
-River Bottom-Area ·K'-on Exhibit A. The foregoing
statements are the direct items of evidence introduced at the
trial; however, throughout the testimony it is clear that considerable conversation occurred relative to the fact that plaintiffs could plow up and farm the particular area (with, as
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plaintiffs believed, an ample supply of water from the reservoir they thought they were purchasing) .
The representation made to plaintiffs concerning the
particular area was made at the time they actually went into
the South Field and dug into the ground at point "J" on Exhibit A. This land had been farmed and was represented as
being ((good" ground by numerous witnesses. However, when
plaintiffs actually plowed part of the "River Bottom area
(encircled as area UK" on Exhibit A) they found the land to
be of a much different texture, being more rocky, gravelly
and of such a type that their crops withered and burned (T.
46). It was of an entirely different type and quality (T. 48).
And not having sufficient water-their actual interest in the
reservoir being but one-fourth-they could not have grown
crops anyway.
The neighbors who testified as witnesses for each side
(rather reluctantly) were quite definite that the land in question in the "River Bottom" area of Sec. 19 was of a different
texture and quality:
WITNESS ROLLINS (for plaintiffs) :
((No, I would say not. It is shallower, more rocks,
showing cobble rocks and gravel."
WITNESS. WILKINSON (for defendants) :

nwell,

it is a little more gravelly."

Defendants, in their brief, have attempted to convince
this court that the plaintiffs actually inspected the ground in
controversy-marked Sec. 19, Pasture, "K" and River Bot20
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tom. However, the jury was soundly convinced ( 8-0) that
no inspection of the land in question was made (R. A-56).
In fact, the representations and matters concerning this area
were found for the plaintiffs by the jury by a unanimous concurrence-one of the few places in the trial where such complete unanimity existed.
The jury properly found that no inspection was made of
the area (which lies east and to the right of the red line marking the fence going North from the South Field on Exhibit
A). The record is ample to support such fact:
Witness Rex Pace on direct examination (T. 58):
A. I got out of .the car at two different places.

Q. Where were they?
A. At point ttA" and point tel"
Again (T. 66):

Q. When you and Mr. Parrish came down to the area
immediately above the south field did you at any
time actually inspect the soil in the river bottom
area marked Section 19 and area K?
A. No, sir.

Q. You didn't actually inspect it?
A. No, sir.
Point ttl" (located north of the South Field on the green
line (roadway) on Exhibit A) was the only place in the
area where the parties got out of the car other than at point A.
It was near this point that the inspection of the South Field
was made and also where the most distinct representation
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concerning the River Bottom area of Section 19 was made.
At no other points did the parties get out of the car for the
purpose of making an inspection of soils. This was further
admitted by the defendant himself (T. 132):
BY MR. PERRY:
A. So here we go, now we came down here (pointing
to roadway east of field etC" on Exhibit A), we
crossed the creek and then we came down through
the little pasture and around here (east of field "G"
on Exhibit A), and we stopped there (Point "I" on
Exhibit A), and I told them ccyou better get out now."
Continuing further on page 132 of the transcript:
A. '' . . . I said 'you better go over the south field and
see for yourselves.' ... "
Defendants are attempting to convince the court that by
driving over the roadway that lies some distance west of the
land in controversy the plaintiffs should have seen the character
of the soil. But what they fail to tell the Court is that this
was an obvious waste area-farmers usually put roads on
waste ground if possible-and was nearer the rocky Cottonwood Creek. Furthermore, the ground in the area in question,
1ying to the east of them some distance, was covered with
grass and sage brush, thereby preventing them from seeing
possible rocks.
Witness Rex Pace, upon cross-examination, made it very
clear that the river bottom area referred to by defendants in
their brief was not the ((River Bottom" area about which the
representations were made (T. 60).

22
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Q. You went over the river bottom ground twice?
A. Along this road, yes.
And at page 63 of the transcript:
Q. When did you learn the river bottom had more rocks
than the south field?

A. That was also next spring.
Q. Couldn't you see them when you traveled over them?
A. I don't think I ever traveled over them.
(4) IN GENERAL.

Defendants take the position that in proving fraud it
is necessary to establish an "intent to deceive." Such is not
the true and correct rule. The only "intent" that must be established is that the defendant intend the plaintiffs be induced
to purchase such property; the nature of the statement made
must only be ((knowingly false" or that the speaker be unaware
of its truth or falsity (see Stuck vs. Dt:lta, supra, and as cited
in defendants' brief; also Instruction to Jury (quoted supra) ) .
.

t

Quoting from Wigmore on Evidence, Sec. 581, p. 721,
note 7:
uln an action of malicious prosecution, where by the
substantive law, intent is regarded as an element, evidence as to intent is admissible. If, however, the action
is for false representation the defendant may not introduce any evidence as to his 'intent,' i.e. that he did not
intend to defraud the plaintiff, because by the substantive law it is the fact of misrepresentation and
not the intent with respect thereto that is regarded as
material and relevant.''
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Plaintiffs will not content themselves with the law, however, but will show that the defendant actually had an ccintent
to deceive." While traveling between point CCI" (just above
the South Field) and the reservoir, the defendant, on direct
examination, recites as follows:
A. Well, after we came from there we came to where
the trees were down west, and he said to me he was
going to push those over and farm that land. I
thought rmaybe you will or maybe you won't. I
don't think he has done it to this day b~ause that
land there I used to pasture ... ''
Again at page 145 of the transcript on cross-examination:

BY MR. FULLER:
Q. You stated on direct examination, (II thought that
cmaybe you will and maybe you won't." Is that what
you actually thought?
A. Will or won't what?

Q. Farm that area and root up the trees?
A. No, I won't. I won't.

Q. What I mean is, you stated when Rex made tha·t
statement you said ccyou thought to yourself, 'maybe
you will or maybe you won't.'
A. I might have thought that but I didn't mention it.
I think he thought he would-I thought right. He
hasn't to this day.

Q. Why did you think he possibly would?
A. Oh, I don't know as to that. I didn't understand him
well enough, perhaps. I know I wouldn't, none of
the land around the trees in there ...

24
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Q. You didn't tell Rex that you thought he wouldn't?
A. No, I heard him make the femark. I didn't argue
with him. That is as far it it goes.
Q. Didn't you consider it a little unfair not to warn him?
A. lHaybe I did and maybe I didn't. I wasn't going to
argue with him nluch. I took them over the land and
they could see the land and judge for themselves.

From 23 Am. Jur. 854:
((The principle is basic in the law of fraud as it relates to non-disclosure, that a charge of fraud is maintainable where a party who knows material facts is
under a duty, under the circumstances, to speak and
disclose his information, but remains silent. Situations
evoking the duty of disclosure may arise in various
ways in different cases."
Again at page 195 of the transcript, Byron Pace testified:
Q. At any time you were having the discussion (while
visiting with Mr. Parrish on May 6, 1950) was
anything mentioned about the view you saw from
point ((A"? *Material in parenthesis added.
A. Yes, sir.

Q. What was said on that day?

A. Rex asked him, CCMr. Parrish, how come we didn't
get this piece of ground?" (the large piece of
ground he pointed to us from point teA," when he
said: c 'Brethren, all the land below you belong to
me.")
Q. What did Mr. Parrish say to that remark?

A. He was silent for two or three minutes, then he
said: "You got what the deeds stated."
25
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And on direct examination (T. 131) the defendant further spoke his mind:
A.

They told me that time, 'We are going to
farm all of that hill.' I never said much, I knew I
hadn't been doing it, maybe they_ knew what they
were talking about. I didn't know, that is up to them,
but that is how it was . . . "
tc

•

•

•

These young men, coming from a farm area entirely foreign to defendants' farm, being lead to believe that they had
acquired a virgin area with great possibilities, and tr~ting
implicitly in this man who referred to them as "Brethren,
etc.", were entitled to be informed of the latter's knowledge
of the peculiar nature of the farm. This is especially so considering the fact that he had lived on it all of his life and
had farmed and owned it tfor 30 or 40 years (T. 7). The
jury fairly found that the defendant was doing a bit of
((sharp trading."
As to the matter of what type of uintent" is necessary in
making a statement that is an element of actionable fraud
our Utah court has gone far beyond the instruction given to
the jury. In Oberg vs. Sanders, 111 Utah 507; 184 Pac. 2d
229, this Court said:
He failed to prove that defendants made a false
representation that the poults were free from disease,
and he consequently failed to prove that defendants
made some statement with knowledge of its falsity or
that defendants knew of conditions which would make
such a representation a reckless one .. .n
( t

•••

And in the case of DeFrees vs. Carr, 8 Utah 488 (a fraud
case) the Court went even further:
26

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

ttAnd even if one misrepresents a material fact by
mistake, relief will be granted; for the assertion of
what he does not know or believe to be true is equally
unjustifiable in law as the assertion of that which is
known to be false.''
In the annotation found at 61 A. L. R. 508 we find this
rule:
(A) Reckless rnisrepresentations. A number of
jurisdictions have adopted the rule that it is immaterial
that the seller does not know his representations to
be false, where he makes them recklessly or without
knowing them to be true; in any event, the buyer is
warranted in relying upon the seller's positive statement of an existing material fact.''
H

In failing to inform plaintiffs that others had interests
in the reservoir, in failing to clarify the fact that the Rollins'
Field didn't go with the farm and in refusing to tell plaintiffs
what he knew of the ('River Bottom'' ground, defendant was
guilty of concealment. He told plaintiffs, in effect, half-truths.
Their brief condemns plaintiffs for not having "suspicious
minds'' at all times. In other words, were plaintiffs required
to inquire as to whether they were buying subject to an outstanding lease, whether machinery or animals were mortgaged,
was there a mechanic's lien on the reservoir or house, etc?
We think that in the absence of suspicious circumstances
(hereinafter discussed) no such unusual duty should be placed
on any purchaser.
Defendants, throughout their brief, attempt to pick out
flaws in plaintiffs' presentation of eviden~e, forgetting that
the defendant possessed the superior knowledge concerning
the farm when the representations were made. Rather than
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select flaws in the plaintiffs' evidence we believe that they had
ample opportuf!ity to pick out those flaws and to show them
to the jury or to reveal the weakness of plaintiffs' case, if any,
by thorough cross-examination.
From 23 Am. Jur. 861 the rule is stated regarding concealment:
celt is firmly established that a partial and fragmentary disclosure, accompanied with the willful concealment of material and· qualifying facts, is not a true
statement, and is as much a fra·ud as an actual misrepresentation, which, in effect, it is. Telling half a truth
has been declared to be equivalent to concealing the
other half. Even though one is under no obligation to
speak as to a matter, if he undertakes to do so, either
voluntarily or in response to inquires, he is bound not
only to state truly what he tells, but also not to suppress or conceal any facts within his knowledge which
will materially qualify those stated. If he speaks at all,
he must make a fair and full disclosure. Therefore, if
one willfully conceals and suppresses such facts and
thereby leads the other party to believe that the matters
to which the statements made related are different
from what they actually are, he is guilty of a fraudulent
concealment.''

(c) The plaintiffs were entitled to rely on the statements
made by defendant concerning the -reservoir, the Rollins'
Field and the River Bottom ground. Had the representations
related to obvious facts, or had suspicious or warning circumstances existed, it would have been the duty of plaintiffs
to investigate rather than to rely on the representations made.
However, the peculiar facts of this case mesh together into
such an unusually plausible situation that there was absolutely
no warning circumstance present.
28
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The reservoir 'vas located entirely within the area of,
and surrounded by, defendants' land. Its inlet and outlet
ditches appeared to come from and end within the farm (since
the Rollins' Field was believed part of the farm also). In
vie'v of the defendant's definite statements heretofore covered
there '\vas no fact that would cause the plaintiffs to inquire
as to the ownership of others. This is especially so when
viewing the statement of defendant, Ida E. Parrish, giving
the reason why this farm was more valuable than that of one
of the neighbors (T. 123) :
A. ttWe told him what one of the neighbors had been
offered, and we told him our place was better than
his, because it has got better water."
Viewing the Rollins' Field it appeared quite logical (see
Ex. E and 7) that the 11% acres was part of the farm. The
irrigation ditch from the reservoir ran around it, the roadway
from the defendants' house ran around the field, it was
fenced (T. 39, 143) much as the rest of the farm-the entire
area being interwoven with a crazy-quilt pattern of crossfencing (See Ex. A), and lay very vividly and clearly in line
with defendants' land on the near and far sides between a
long row of cottonwood trees of the creek area on one side
and hills on the other. It appeared so logically a part of the
farm that it is not surprising that the evidence shows it to
have once been part thereof (T. 167).
To the person believing that the reservoir went with the
farm, and seeing that this field was also watered from the
same reservoir, we can again see the inseparability of the
statements made and the acts of fraud complained of. Putting
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the situation another way we could say that had the plaintiffs
clearly understood that the Rollins' field did not belong to the
place they were purchasing they would have then been put on
notice of suspicious circumstances because the reservoir was
the source of its water. They would have then known that
others might have had interests in the reservoir.
Defendants' argument that the Rollins field was separated
by fences can bear little discussion because the entire area was
cross-fenced. And as pointed out heretofore, fences ran around
this field also. Furthermore, viewing the field from the distance of some one-half mile, the evidence was ample to show
that fence lines looked like breaks in crops from one field to
another, particularly since fence lines were covered with weeds.
If the Court entertains any doubt 9n this matter it need only
look at Exhibits E and 7. The fence lines separating the property would have been visible but for three or four rods due
to brush.
Although defendants' brief considers such a belief as
plaintiffs entertained as fictional we contend that it is logical.
Furthermore, they consider this 11 3M acres of land as a mere
11 3A part of 64 5 acres ( 2%) . But the evidence shows that
only 63 ·acres out of the 645 were irrigated. The testimony of
Lee Rollins clearI y indicated that this was more valuable than
any of defendants' irrigated land and was larger than any of
the irrigated pieces of defendants' farm other than the South
Field (T. 103, 104, 105). In short, this piece stuck out like
a sore thumb and its inclusion in the farm was of prime· importance in the farm's purchase, far more so than the $2,400.00
figure the jury indicated its value to be if standing alone.
30
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And to remove the faintest possibility that plaintiffs
might have found· out that the land belonged to another they
\Veren't furnished with an abstract of title until at least 60
days after the agreement was drawn up on December 4, 1947.
The inseparability of the statements becomes even more
clear when we consider the representations made concerning
the river bottom ground. The plaintiffs, believing that they
had purchased an undeveloped farm with a plentiful water
supply, intended to break up this area and farm it. From
the conversation heretofore brought out the defendant knew
of their intentions and remained silent as to his own views
despite his peculiar knowledge gained from living on the
farm all of his life. In fact (T. 95), the defendant encouraged
this belief by pointing out other areas of the farm that he had
cleared the year before. Plaintiffs did actually break up some
land on the high ground east of the reservoir and are now
dry farming that area (T. 42).
Upon viewing the misrepresentations as a whole and in
their proper light we can see why no suspicious circumstances
appeared. Although defendants have attacked each item piecemeal and thereby seek to confuse the entire picture, such does
not give to this Court a true picture of the transaction.
The jury was well aware of the foregoing situation and
properly found that the plaintiffs were entitled to rely on the
representations under the circumstances.
At 61 A. L. R. 519:
"The buyer has a right to rely upon the seller's representation as to matters which are peculiarly within the
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latter's knowledge and of which the buyer is ignorant,
and the failure of the buyer to investigate the facts,
although he has an opportunity to do so, does not in
such a case preclude him from asserting against the
seller the latter's misrepresentations with respect to
such matters.''
The Court's Instruction (No.
embodied the foregoing rule.

~)

to the jury carefully

In the leading Utah case of Stuck vs. Delta Land & Water
Co., 63 Utah 495, the plaintiffs came to central Utah and purchased land in an irrigation project after reading representations contained in a circular that the area was a "thoroughly
proven general farming district." The Utah court held that
the plaintiff could recover damages because the land actually
contained alkali and was not as represented. The further fact
. that the plaintiffs made some investigation of the ground was
held no grounds for barring their recovery.
Plaintiff Rex Pace testified that the plaintiffs "definitely"
relied on each of the representations made by the defendant
( T. 53) and that they could see no suspicious circumstances
at the time ( T. 71) they inspected the farm. Plaintiffs relied on
the defendant's representations and trusted him, being total
strangers to that area. Although the record indicates throughout that the parties referred to each other as "Brethren" and
in other similar friendly terms, it does not indicate that the
defendant was a former Stake Patriarch in the L. D. S. Church
and, as such, subject to being believed by religious men of the
same faith. This latter fact, along with its innuendo that
the defendant was a man of high repute, was carefully brought
to the jury's attention in argument by defense counsel.
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At 61 A. L. R. 526 \\'e find this rule:
HWhere, by reason of the seller,s superior knowledge
or experience with respect to the thing sold, or because
of relations of friendship or trust existing between
the buyer and seller, the buyer expressly relies upon
the honesty of the seller and the latter, s representations
as to the subject-matter of the sale without attempting
to ascertain the truth of the representations the seller
is bound to act honorably and deal fairly with the buyer,
and is generally held liable for fraud or misrepresentations, although the buyer might have ascertained the
facts by an independent investigation.'' (Italics added.)
The foregoing rule was given to the jury, in substance,
in Instruction No. 4. In fact, defendants' proposed Instruction No. 8, to the effect that the parties were dealing with
each other at Harm's length" and that no confidential relationship existed between them, was wisely rejected by the Court
after hearing the evidence.
Quoting from 23 Am. Jur. 956:.
"It is well settled that a representee has a right to
rely upon representations where a confidential relationship exists between the parties. In such cases a
high degree of frankness and fair dealing is required,
and the representee cannot be charged with lack of
diligence in failing to make an independent investigation, either at the time or afterward . . . The same
principle has been applied where the representee has
declared himself to be a stranger to the property which
is the subject matter of the transaction, and where
the representor enjoys a high reputation for integrity
and honesty in the community in which he lives."
(Italics added.)

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

As to what constitutes a ccconfidential" relationship we
find the rule stated in 23 Am. Jur. 763:
CCThe term 'fiduciary or confidential relationship' is
a very board one. Courts of equity have carefully refrained from defining the particular instances of fiduciary relations in such a matter as to exclude other and
perhaps new cases. The cases of parent and child,
guardian and ward, trustee and cestui que trust, and
principal and agent are familiar instances in which
the principle of fiduciary relationship applies in its
strictest sense. In operation, however, it is not confined
to the dealings and transactions between the parties
standing in these relations, but extends to all relations
in which confidence is reposed, and in which dominion
and influence resulting from such confidence may be
exercised by one person over another . . . The relation
and the duties involved in it need not be legal. It
may be moral, social, domestic, or merely personal."
The defendant in showing plaintiffs' the farm instructed
them where and \vhen to stop for purposes of inspection. Because he used a cane he did not venture from the car very
far, and this fact deterred plaintiffs considerably in going
any distance from the car. As to making a more detailed inspection Byron Pace stated (T. 91) :
A. CCI guess we could of, if Mr. Parrish could have
walked with us."
The defendant knew that these boys were trusting in his
superior knowledge and that it would be unlikely that they
would leave him alone while making their inspection. The
defendant directed the investigation entirely as indicated by
the following statement (T. 191):
34
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HWell, you have seen the farm, now I guess we
can go back.'·
Despite the fact that defendant claims to have told the
boys to investigate for themselves he cannot avoid paying
the penalty for false representations. From 23 Am. Jur. 966,
the rule is provided that:
"A representor cannot escape liability for his misrepresentations by advising the representee to investigate and to satisfy himself as to the property before
acquiring it.''
In connection with defendants' cited case of Forrester vs.
Jastad plaintiffs contend that it might be good law, but wholly
not in point because that case involved a personal inspection
of the kind of soil involved. Having cleared this issue by
showing that the River Bottom area, in particular, and the
Rollins' land were never investigated by plaintiffs, that case
can serve no point in this lawsuit.
The general law is well summarized in 23 Am. Jur. 970:
HThe rule is followed at the present time in practically all American jurisdictions, in respect of transactions involving both real and personal property, that
one to whom a positive, distinct and definite representation has been made is entitled to rely on such representation and need not make further inquiry concerning the particular facts involved. This rule is a
corollary to the broad principle of a general right of
reliance upon positive statements. Under this rule it
is sufficient if the representations are of a character
to induce action, and do induce it, and the only question to be considered is whether the misrepresentations
actually deceived and mislead the complaining party.
Under such circumstances, it is immaterial that the
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means of knowledge are open to the complaining
party, or are easily available to him, and that he may
ascertain the truth by p~oper inquiry or investigation."

That the representations were material, that they were
made for the purpose of inducing defendants to purchase
the farm, that plaintiffs were ignorant of the falsity of the
statements is implicit from volumes of evidence in the record.
Rex Pace, on direct examination (T. 53), made this quite clear:
Q. You have stated certain statements he has made to
you. Did you rei y on each of those statements?
A. Definitely, we did.
Q. Did they influence you in purchasing the place?
A. To a great extent.
Q. Did they influence you as to the amount of money
you paid for it?
A. Yes.
(d) Damages were proved. The sole remaining element
to be established in this case is whether the damages awarded
are supported by the evidence. Inasmuch as $8,470.00 of the
award of $8,650.00 related to the reservoir, the Rollins' field
and the river bottom area in question plaintiffs will confine the
discussion to those items, particularly since the other $180.00
of damages so clearly sustains itself. In supporting the jury's
verdict plaintiffs are not attempting to show how the jury
arrived at its figure-only they themselves know that factbut will show the evidence introduced by which the jury could
arrive at the figure.
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At the time the complaint was prepared this writer reasoned that the case would stand or fall upon proving fraud
concerning the reservoir. Investigation showed no one in
the vicinity had any definite idea of the actual value of a share
of stock in the Northwest Irrigation Company. Lee Rollins,
Secretary of the con1pany and possibly the most competent to
testify, admitted on cross-examination that the only experience
he had had was with this little irrigation company of four
members (T. 108).
As pointed out previously the representations concerning
the Rollins' field and the River Bottom area were so interrelated and dependent upon the representations with respect
to the reservoir that no one item could exist in this case without the other two. In short, the land without the water was
practically valueless and the water without the land was almost ,
equally so. This reservoir did not serve a large area where a
share of water stock had any established value.
Thus, it appeared that damages would have to be proved
as a single unit. Here again, the theory of inseparability heretofore mentioned was all important. And in realizing that the
jury might find against plaintiffs on some particular item it was
necesary to put in evidence of value on those items so that
a proper amount could be deducted from the damage evidence
given on the place as a unit.
Therefore, the complaint was worded as follows (R. A-4) :
6

''That the value of 'the aforesaid ranch as it actually was when purchased was Twenty-Five Thousand
( $~5,000.00) Dollars, whereas it would have been
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worth Fifty Thousand ( $50,000.00) Dollars if it had
actually been as represented . . . "
The foregoing allegation correctly states the ((benefit
of bargain" rule of damages followed in Utah, and the writer
referred directly to two Utah decisions:

DeFrees v. Carr, 8 Utah 488:
(The proper measure of damages in such a case
(fraud) is the difference between the actual value of
the land purchased by appellant as it would have been
if as represented and as it actually was."
t

Kinnear et al v. Prows, et al. (1932), 81 Utah 135;
16 Pac. 2d 1094:
((The measure of damages for fraud is the difference
between the value of the property purchased and the
value it would have had if the representations were
true."
See also 24 Am. Jur. 63, citing Hecht v. Metzler,
supra, as standing for the same rule.)
And the jury was properly instructed in Instructions attached to Interrogatory No. VII (T. 208) as follows:

rrMeasttre of Damages: The measure of damages in
a case of this kind is the difference between the value
of the property purchased and the value it would have
had if the representations had been true.
A. Total Damages pertaining to the farm property

$·-----In following their theory· of damages plaintiffs asked
Lee Rollins, whose qualifications are not challenged, the
value of sa~d farm in 1947, including buildings and watet
stock or water right:
38
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A. H\Vell, I believe, the way farms were selling that
time and in this locality, we didn't hear of any farms
selling at the price this farm sold for. We thought $30
or $35 thousand as a good price at that time."
There was considerable other evidence, in detail, as to the
actual value of the place by computing the total of the various
parcels of land and buildings making up the farm unit given
by 11r. Rollins and by the defendant himself (See transcript
14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 107, 108 and 109).
In determining the value of the farm as it would have
been jf the representations were true Mr. Rollins was asked

(T. 109-110):
Q. HWell, excluding the personal property, the
machinery and personal property on the premises and
including just the real property, the land and buildings
on the place, and assuming the entire reservoir went
\vith the farm, and your eleven and three-fourths acres
of land went with it, and the south field was in a high
state of productivity . . ."
(At this point counsel was interrupted and it was
claimed there was no evidence of the "high state of
productivity" of the south field, and the Court indicated
a. condition comparable to "good.")
'' . . . and, assuming there were 30 acres of the river
bottom that could be used or farmed, and assuming
the land in Section 19 was of the same quality of soil
(as the south field) , what would you value the farm
at?''
A. "That would make quite a farm of it. It would be
be forty or forty-five thousand."

Q. For the land? You are excluding the machinery
and personal property?
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A. Yes, I would say $40,000.00."
The foregoing testimony of Mr. Rollins and the other
witnesses established a basic difference of $10,000.00 as measure of damages, assuming the south field to be in Ctgood"
condition. It was later established that the south field was in
ttgood condition~' (T. 240, 161) and plai~tiffs were unable
to introduce any valuation showing a different condition. Consequently, the figure arrived at was the total damages to the
farm based on the fraudulent statements concerning the reservoir, the river bottom ground and the Rollins' field.
The findings of the jury were consistent in every respect
with the evidence given. In reading the 5 ¥2 pages of questions
propounded to them it can be seen that the jury made findings
entirely consistent w!th the evidence and plaintiffs' theory of
the case. In denying defendants' motion for a new trial and
upholding the damages award Judge. Cowley felt that the
damages awarded and plaintiffs' theory of the case were entire! y proper.
Defendants condemn plaintiffs' position in failing to segregate damages concerning the reservoir from the other items.
However, as has been pointed out, the entire lawsuit was so
interrelated as to make this practically impossible. In this
respect they once again seek to attack the damage award
in piece-meal fashion. They argue that in breaking down
the damage award there is insufficient evidence to justify'
$2400.00 for the Rollins' field, $1750.00 for the River Bottom
area and $4320.00 ttin respect to the (Reservoir' and (Water
Rights'."
40
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Plaintiffs originally asked for a general verdict only
(R. A-37), which was denied by the Court. Then, realizing
that interrogatories were to be submitted-and wishing to
protect themselves-requested a general verdict with speeial
interrogatories. This latter request, also, was denied, but the
Court accepted plaintiffs' interrogatories almost without exception instead of those submitted by defendants (R. A~41 & 42).
The Court then accepted plaintiffs' proposed in~truction
on measure of damages; but, in so doing, also attached subquestions 1, 3 and 5 (T. 214):
A. Total Damages pertaining to the farm
property -------..-----------------------·------------------------$8, 7so. oo
1. Does this figure include anything for the
Rollins piece containing 11% acres. If
so,· how much?--------------------------·------------ 2,400.00
~·.Does

the total figure include anything
for the "River Bottom Land?'' If so,
how much? --------------------------------------------

1, 750.00

5. Does the total figure include ··anything
in respect to the rr Reservoir" and Water
Rights"? If so, how much?-------------------- 4,320.00
(Italics added.)
In arriving at the figure of $8,750.00 we can see that it
is well within the evidence. The lesser figures of $2,400.00
(for 11 314 acres of Rollins' ground at approximately $200.00
per acre [T. 103)) and $1,750.00 for the "River Bottom"
ground (worth $100.00 per acre if as good as the south field
[T. 14]-less $10.00 an acre acutal value [T. 105]-or
$90.00 x 20 actual acres that could be farmed if as good as
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the south field (T. 94], or, in all, $1,800.00) were arrived
at very logically. T'hen, in arriving at the figure t(in respect
to the (Reservoir' and (Water Rights'· the jury possibly simply
subtracted from the basic damage figure they originally determined. However, this latter conclusion may not have actually been the case since the reservoir used up over 20 acres
of land (which was represented as belonging to the· place)
and since it was worth well over the $7,000.00 expended in
1943 (T. 101) in enlarging it.
Considering the further fact th~t plaintiffs required twice
the water they now have for the land they now farm (T. 48),
plus what they would need for the 20 acres of River Bottorrt
ground actually available and the water needed for the Rollins'
land (the value of the Rollins' land being $200.00 per acre,
but ((not with its permanent water right" (T. 103]) there should
be sufficient evidence.
Under plaintiffs' theory that there can be no proper seg·
regation of the statements of fraud it is contended that there
can be no segregation of damages. The Court agreed with
this contention in denying defendants' motion for new trial
based upon the damages awarded in respect to the reservoir
and water rights. In fact ( T. 201), when the Court and
counsel discussed the matter of damages pertaining to water
before submitting it to the jury this matter came up:
MR. FULLER: We have it on the general statement
of the evidence on the farm. I didn't make issue of
the stock, certificate of stock.
THE COURT: That would give the value.
THE COURT (to Mr. Perry): You just take an
42
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exception to . . . the interpretation on the question
THE COURT (referring to the reasons for having
the jury individually itemize damages as to the reservoir, Rollins· field and River Bottom area) :
'~I

am making a backward approach."

Actually, the sub-questions 1, 3 and 5 on damages were
superfluous and the Court so recognized them. They were
merely given for the purpose of determining whether the jury
considered a dan1age figure for the different items. This is
particularly so whe~ we view their wording-"in respect of"
and udoes the figure include anything for' '-plus the fact
that the Court upheld the total damage figure on these items
as against defendants' motion to have the verdict reduced
or a new trial granted.
In requiring that plaintiffs theorize the exact method
used by the jury in determining damages the answer is best
set forth in the fraud case of Stuck vs. Delta Land & Water
Co. (supra). In that case, too, the damages were not segregated since there was no showing that the land or watet
had value apart from each other (See T. 201):
It is perhaps sufficient to say that verdicts
of juries, especially in actions for damages, can seidom
be determined with mathematical precision even by
the jurors themselves. If their verdicts can be set aside
simply because the party in whose favor the verdict is
rendered, or the court,· is unable to mathematically
determine how the jury arrived at its conclusion, a very
large percentage of verdicts would be set aside as unsupported by the evidence. If the verdict is within the
evidence and not obviously inco~sistent therewith, that
H

•••
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is sufficient and oftentimes all that can reasonably be
expected.''
Mr. Rollins, b,eing a lifetime neighbor of the defenda11ts
and a present neighbor of the plaintiffs, was reluctant to
testify too favorably for either. His estimate on the difference
in value of the property is, in plaintiffs' opinion, very conservative. The jury's verdict was well within his estimate.
Had defendants been in an ''out of pocket'' jurisdiction such
as California the measure of damages would have been the
difference between the actual value of the property and what
plaintiffs paid for it ( $45,000.00). The award for damages
in such a case would have been $5,000.00 greater. As it is
the plaintiffs are not nearly recovering damages commensurate
with their out-of-pocket loss.
Defendants overlook another important fact long recognized in ·partition suits-that the whole of a farm is greater
than the sum of aU· its parts. In other words, the Rollins'
field, standing alone was worth $2,400.00, but its i~portance
as a part of an existing farm unit was much greater.
III
DEFENDANTS HAD A FAIR TRIAL.
It must be remembered that the defendant had the benefit
of living in Morgan County all of his life. He occupied a
prominent position in the church. The defense constantly
and obviously pointed out the defendants' infirmities and ages
(T. 125, 126, 132, 187).
On the other hand the jury could see that the plaintiffs
were fair and_ honest, answering each and every question put
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to them. The defendants had a poor memory of all of the
transaction other than events and conversations which did not
occur in a manner detrimental to them.
The jury deliberated carefully for six hours in answering
5 ~·2 pages of interrogatories insisted upon by defendants for
the purpose of reaching each issue of the case. It would appear, as stated by Mr. Justice Crockett of this Court in a recent
Utah Bar Bulletin that:
Sometimes these requests are so framed that
it appears that counsel is hoping, or perhaps actually
attempting to invite error on the part of the court
so that if the defendant suffers an adverse judgment he
may have the possibility of reversal on appeal."
tt

•••

The jury was instructed in a maner most fair to defendants:
Instruction No. 5
•tit is a well-established rule of law that fraud is

never presumed, that when a transaction is explainable upon the theory of honesty and fair dealing that ·
theory should be adopted.
Hence is you can explain any of the alleged misrepresentations of defendant on the theory that he was
acting fairly and honestly, with no intention to induce
the plaintiffs to purchase the farm by any alleged misrepresentations, then it is your duty so to do."
THE JUDGMENT SHOULD BE AFFIRMED.
Respectfully submitted,
GLEN E. FULLER
Attorney fo1" Respondents
705-7 First Security Bank Bldg.
Salt Lake City, Utah
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